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ABSTRACT: This article asks how the pursuit of major engineering works causes changes in existing water-society 
relations. We employ the concept of the hydrosocial cycle postulated by Linton and Budds (2014) as an analytical 
framework and draw specific insights from political ecology and science and technology studies (STS). Using as a 
case study a sea wall megaproject plan in Jakarta, Indonesia, we find that such a project can depoliticise the cityʼs 
water security issues by rendering them technical and by dehumanising citizens and discounting the future. Using 
scientific language and logic, policymakers discourage the exploration of alternatives other than the sea wall. To 
repoliticise these water issues, we mobilise the concept of the hydrosocial cycle and tailor it to the context of large 
infrastructure. We identify departure points that may improve the current socio-natural process in Jakarta, 
particularly the empowerment of the middle class to voice their project-related concerns, and the recognition of 
the different capacities of each group in society to adapt to water-related hazards. 
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INTRODUCTION: LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A WATER-SECURE CITY 
As the world becomes more urbanised,1 the goal to achieve a water-secure city has never been more 
relevant. Water security has gradually been replacing Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
as a water management paradigm (Cook and Bakker, 2012; del Moral et al., 2014); it has gained increased 
interest in both academic scholarship and policy circles since its introduction in 2000. Some review 
articles (e.g. Cook and Bakker, 2012; Zeitoun et al., 2016) have captured the diverse conceptualisations 
of water security research, and as water challenges grow such scholarly attention appears to be 
continuing (e.g. Gober et al., 2015; Jepson et al., 2017). Focusing on the urban context, we follow 
Grasham et al.ʼs (2019: 3) definition of water security as "a tolerable and equitable level of chronic or 
intermittent water-related risk for urban dwellers". To date, water security research has covered a wide 
range of sectors (e.g. drinking water, water-related hazards, agriculture) at a variety of scales including 
those determined by political boundaries such as city and state, and natural boundaries such as 
                                                          
1 According to the UN (2018), 68% of the world’s population is projected to be urban by 2050, as compared to 55% in 2018 and 
30% in 1950. This figure suggests that we now live in an 'urban age'. This widely adopted figure is, however, contended by 
Brenner and Schmid (2014: 731). They argue that the urban age thesis "is empirically untenable (a statistical artefact) and 
theoretically incoherent (a chaotic conception)" because there is no specific rule for drawing the boundaries of an urban, or 
urbanising, area. As a result, many countries differ in their classification of urban-rural areas. 
Water Alternatives – 2019  Volume 12 | Issue 3 
Octavianti and Charles: Jakartaʼs sea wall plan  Page | 1018 
catchment areas. In this paper, we are interested in analysing water security problems at a megacity 
level, with a megacity being defined as one with a population of more than 10 million (UN, 2018). As large 
and powerful political entities and as centres of economic growth, one of the main approaches to the 
enhancement of megacity water security is that of building large-scale hydraulic structures. 
Some scholars, such as Linton and Budds (2014), have noted that in the past decade the hydraulic 
mission – which is the use of engineering works to exploit waterways in the service of humanity (Molle 
et al., 2009) – has given way to modes of water governance. Others, such as Crow-Miller et al. (2017), 
have observed the contrary, noting the large-scale water structures that are being built, or are planned, 
around the world. This trend demonstrates the (re)turn to investing in infrastructure for water 
management. Recent projects include south-to-north water transfer in China, interbasin water transfer 
in São Francisco, Brazil, the trans-Andean tunnel in Peru, and the sea walls in Jakarta and Dhaka. The 
justification of most of these projects has been the enhancement of water security in urban areas; dense 
with people and assets, these urban areas would receive more water and would be more protected from 
environmental hazards. Eighteen out of the 23 megacities are located in coastal areas and are therefore 
prone to water-related hazards (Pelling and Blackburn, 2013), further justifying the construction of such 
large infrastructures. The hydraulic mission is now being promoted as a way to guarantee water security 
in the face of increasing climate instability. Scott (1998) suggests that the construction of large 
infrastructures is a 'state simplification', meant to reduce the difficulty of solving complex water 
problems. 
Discussion of water security and infrastructure in this paper is anchored in the concept of 
hydrosociality (Jepson et al., 2017), which has broadened the framework of the traditional hydrologic 
cycle to encompass the co-construction of water and society (Swyngedouw, 2009). Hydrosociality 
deliberately attends to waterʼs social and political nature (Linton and Budds, 2014). Developed within the 
political ecology tradition and inspired by science and technology studies (STS), hydrosociality is 
characterised by its discussion of power and politics (de la Motte, 2013; Boelens, 2014; Meehan, 2014). 
(A number of theoretical developments in hydrosociality will be reviewed in the next section.) Here we 
use the term hydrosocial cycle, as postulated by Linton and Budds (2014), as a lens to analyse water 
security. Employing a relational-dialectical approach, Linton and Budds conceptualise the hydrosocial 
cycle as the "process of making and remaking (…) the social construction and production of water" (ibid: 
171). A sea wall megaproject in Jakarta, Indonesia, is a vivid example of the way in which technological 
intervention changes existing hydrosocial relations. 
Through the lens of the hydrosocial cycle, this paper seeks to explore the political ecology of water 
security by (i) examining the extent to which large infrastructure can change the existing water-society 
relations, and (ii) investigating how the state exercises its power through infrastructure. These issues 
matter because policymakers tend to think that they have solved the problems by pursuing large 
infrastructure, while in fact such large projects enhance water security for only a particular group and 
usually at the expense of other groups. Our main argument in this paper is that major engineering work 
has the potential to depoliticise the core business of water security in sustaining livelihoods. To 
repoliticise the issue, we propose to refine the concept of the hydrosocial cycle by placing a greater 
emphasis on the role of infrastructure and by exploring the heterogeneity within a society in terms of 
how different groups participate in, and are affected by, the cycle. This paper contributes to a wider 
conceptualisation of water, society and technology, and advances understanding of how infrastructure 
manifests the intricate connections between water security and power relations. As the power relations 
produced in the construction of basic infrastructure – such as the piped-water networks that many 
developing cities are urged to build (Khatri and Vairavamoorthy, 2007; McDonald et al., 2011) – are very 
different from those produced in the construction of large infrastrucutre, we do not consider the former 
in this article (Kooy, 2008; Warner, 2008; Bichsel, 2016; Obertreis et al., 2016). 
This paper presents a literature review on hydrosocial research deriving from political ecology and 
STS, followed by an introduction to the case study and our research methods. Next, we discuss three 
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mechanisms by which infrastructure can depoliticise water and we analyse the role of state power in 
shaping this policy. Following that, the concept of the hydrosocial cycle is refined by emphasising the role 
played by a major water engineering project in changing water-society relations. The final section 
presents our concluding remarks. 
HYDROSOCIALITY: WATER-SOCIETY-INFRASTRUCTURE 
Some authors have argued that hydrosociality is the basis of water security (Jepson et al., 2017; Staddon 
et al., 2017). In this paper, we attempt to link water security and infrastructure in order to contribute to 
this conceptualisation, as large infrastructure generates unevenly distributed positive and negative 
consequences (Swyngedouw, 2009). The hydrosocial concept was inspired by the political ecology of 
water tradition as well as by the social study of science (Swyngedouw, 2004; Kaika, 2005; Budds, 2009; 
Linton, 2010). It emerged from criticism of the concept of the hydrological cycle as being not sufficient to 
understand the social aspects of water (Mollinga, 2014). Hydrologists tend to understand water as 
"behaving in a consistent, uniform and rational manner" (Budds, 2009: 420). According to the hydrosocial 
concept, water is important to human life not only because of its physical materiality – depicted as H2O 
by Swyngedouw (2005), Budds (2009) and Jepson et al. (2017) – but also because of its social functioning. 
Hydrosociality is not the only framework by which the relations between water and society are 
examined. Similar ideas with different conceptualisations and trajectories of analysis are shared by other 
approaches, such as waterscape (e.g. Baviskar, 2007; Loftus, 2007, Karpouzoglou and Vij, 2017), socio-
natures (Castree and Braun, 2001), and socio-hydrology (Sivapalan et al., 2012; Wesselink et al., 2017). 
Karpouzoglou and Vij (2017) view waterscape as a perspective (rather than a theoretical framework) that 
emphasises the geographical situatedness in producing unequal hydrosocial relations. Castree and Braun 
(2001) develop socio-natures as an analytical lens through which to investigate the diverse social 
construction of nature and to examine how this process affects livelihoods, ecologies and politics. Unlike 
the approaches that have previously emerged from the social science root, socio-hydrology was 
developed among natural scientists, particularly hydrologists, who viewed the need to address the 
complexity and interdependence of water-related societal challenges. Developed from the positivist 
paradigm, socio-hydrology research focuses on incorporating human behaviour into socio-hydrological 
models (Wesselink et al., 2017). While both overlapping and having notable differences, these 
perspectives should be viewed as mutually reinforcing approaches to better understand the interaction 
between water and people. 
The concept of hydrosociality itself has been developed in many ways. As a territory, hydrosociality 
consists of "a spatial configuration of people, institutions, water flows, hydraulic technology and the 
biophysical environment that revolve around the control of water" (Boelens et al., 2016: 1). As an 
assemblage, hydrosociality provides a bridge between a specific kind of water and a particular kind of 
social relationship (Linton, 2010). As a cycle – which is the focus of this article – hydrosociality is much 
more concerned with the cyclical making and remaking of that relationship as it travels through the social 
and water domains. This is the hybrid physical-social process that enables discussion on the production 
of social inequality and the power relations therein (Swyngedouw, 2009). The hydrosocial cycle also 
touches on the role of technology, albeit very lightly. 
Focusing on the power and politics manifested in large infrastructures, we specifically draw insights 
from the STS traditions, especially the Large Technical Systems (LTS) school (Ewertsson and Ingelstam, 
2004). We use this framework to examine the creation, development and consequences of technological 
innovation in its cultural and social contexts (Morita, 2017). From the STS perspective, infrastructure can 
be seen as a process (Carse, 2012), as relations between things (Larkin, 2013), as an inhabitable ground 
(Butler, 2014), as a source of possibilities (Corsín Jiménez, 2014), and as a political machine and a work 
in progress (Jensen and Morita, 2015). Despite these diverse conceptualisations, there is an agreed need 
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to perceive infrastructure beyond its physical qualities, since it can create new polities and can shape 
societies and environments (Jensen and Morita, 2015). 
Wittfogel (1957) was among the first authors to articulate the relationship between water and power. 
Referencing Karl Marx, he argues that a labour-intensive water infrastructure requires a coordinated 
system or a large centralised authority, creating a 'hydraulic society'. Wittfogelʼs technological 
determinism, however, has simplified the complex realities of the relationship (Peet, 1988; Livingstone, 
2011). Hydrosocial studies were partly inspired by his work but there is a fundamental dissimilarity 
amongst them. Wittfogel considers humanity and nature to be separable and believes them to maintain 
discrete identities despite their interaction; by contrast, hydrosocialists maintain that they are internally 
related and are co-constitutive of each other (Swyngedouw, 2009; Obertreis et al., 2016). 
Discussion of technology and society as explored in the STS literature can be a means to challenge 
large infrastructureʼs promise of water security. While promoters of large infrastructure foster the hope 
of livelihood betterment through technology, critiques that reveal the disappointment of that hope are 
not uncommon. The neediest group is likely to experience continued inequities, and even a deterioration 
in their living conditions. Human "freedom is annihilated by the rational-technological-instrumental 
imperative" (Harbers, 2005: 12). In the current STS discussions, the use of the terms 'activism', 
'intervention' and 'engagement' signals a desire to critically address the way science and technology 
affect changes and redress inequities in particular cultural and institutional circumstances (Sismondo, 
2007). In his discussion of the social aspects of technology, Latour (1987) suggests that a technological 
artefact will function "when all the relevant people are convinced". Elaborating on the definition of 
"relevant people", Geels (2005) suggests two basic groups: the "system builders" or "heroes" who can 
intervene in the system, and the "faceless automata following iron rules, institutions or given/functions" 
who can do nothing to influence the system. This insight is of interest here because it embraces the idea 
of human agency, which is lacking in much STS literature (Furlong, 2014). 
While large infrastructure is portrayed as an apolitical means to achieve water security, it should not 
be assumed that scientists and engineers behind the infrastructure are not political actors; they act 
politically – consciously or not – through knowledge generation. The politics is thus often subtle and can 
be disguised as numerical justification (Gutiérrez, 2010; Zwarteveen, 2017; Landström and Whatmore, 
2018). Scientific evidence is increasingly perceived by society as being socially constructed and politically 
motivated (Linton and Budds, 2014). Because of the domination of scientific and technical knowledge in 
many societies, engineers and other scientists are often positioned to exert a powerful influence on 
political agendas by, for example, foregrounding positive projected calculations and the stability of the 
system, and guaranteeing the outcome (Latour, 1987; Gutiérrez, 2010). 
Some authors have analysed how depoliticisation occurs in environmental policies. One of the earliest 
authors looking at this issue is Ferguson (1994) who examines development projects in Lesotho. He 
investigates how ahistorical descriptions were used to characterise 'underdeveloped' countries and how 
technical solutions were proposed by experts with little information about the 'target group'. (Towards 
the end of this paper we shall refer to Fergusonʼs arguments, in discussing our findings from Jakartaʼs 
case). In a similar vein, Li (2007) explores expertsʼ attempts to alleviate poverty in the highlands of 
Sulawesi, Indonesia, through community participation in the integration of conservation and 
development. She demonstrates how experts have devised technical solutions to conditions of poverty 
and injustice that are, in fact, rooted in the political economy. Studying water supply issues in India, Joy 
et al. (2014) argue that water problems are problems of justice because mainstream approaches to water 
allocation and legislation tend to normalise their distributional implications in such a way that the least 
powerful group suffers from exclusion and lack of access. Scientific findings have been used by engineers 
and natural scientists to justify water allocations that thereby appear to be inevitable and natural. Lastly, 
Atkins (2019) investigates the conflict that arose from the construction of the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil. 
Its proponents foregrounded the dam within the depoliticised context of economic benefits, which were 
then countered by the damʼs opponents who brought forward the issue of political corruption. Atkins 
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asserts that this effort to repoliticise the damʼs construction can influence developments beyond its 
immediate site and impacts. We build our arguments from this scholarship in our analysis of the 
depoliticisation mechanisms that affect large water infrastructure. 
This section has discussed relevant insights from the hydrosocial literature and has reviewed research 
in STS scholarship that specifically addresses studies of infrastructure. To our knowledge, a 
conceptualisation of water security that pays close attention to infrastructure has not been widely 
undertaken and hence we hope this paper can contribute to scholarship in this area. 
A MEGA SEA WALL IN JAKARTA BAY 
In examining how large infrastructure may affect water-society relations, we use a sea wall megaproject 
in Jakarta, Indonesia, as a case study. The sea wall is part of a flagship megaproject of the National Capital 
Integrated Coastal Development (NCICD) that was proposed to save Jakarta from sinking. As a delta city, 
40% of Jakartaʼs area is located below sea level (Firman et al., 2011). If this combines with land subsidence 
at an average rate of 15 cm per year (Abidin et al., 2011) – which is among the fastest in the world – 
together with eustatic sea level rise at a rate of 3 millimetres per year (Deltares, 2015), Jakartaʼs risk of 
sinking is extremely high. 
In November 2013, the Indonesian government launched the NCICD project, consisting of the 
construction of a 32 km offshore sea wall, reclamation of 1250 hectares (ha) of land and the construction 
of a 7500 ha retention lake (NCICD, 2014), at a total cost of US$40 billion. The offshore sea wall will 
function to reduce coastal flooding caused by sea level rise. The combined operation of a huge pumping 
system and a large retention lake (to reduce the mean sea level in the bay) is expected to minimise the 
risk of riverine flooding. It is predicted that some rivers in Jakarta will not be able to flow under gravity 
due to subsidence in the northern part of the city; therefore, the river water will be contained in the 
retention lake and pumped out to sea. To attract private funding, land reclamation was added to the 
plan. At the time of the launch of the NCICD project, the lake was also projected to be a water supply 
reservoir (ibid), but this plan was subsequently dropped because of the high cost of water treatment. 
Since its launch, the NCICD project has undergone some changes. In 2016, a project to construct 17 
artificial islands in Jakarta Bay was integrated with the NCICD plan by the Government of Indonesia, 
following a corruption scandal involving the islandsʼ construction. The total reclamation area then 
became 5100 ha. In September 2018, the newly elected governor of Jakarta, Anies Baswedan, was faithful 
to his campaign promise to revoke the permits for the building of the 17 islands, which were opposed 
because of their anticipated massive environmental costs. In June 2019, however, he approved the 
issuance of 932 building permits on Islands C and D. He asserted that he had already kept his promise of 
stopping further reclamation (of 13 islands) and that the artificial islands – C, D, G and N – would be made 
available for public use (Aqil, 2019). In June 2019, the Indonesian Ministry of Public Works and Public 
Housing signed memorandums of understanding (MoUs) on the second phase of the NCICD project with 
Dutch and South Korean partners; the media release, however, did not give details of this 'second phase' 
(Iswara, 2019). It may refer to Phase B of the NCICD project, which is the construction of the offshore sea 
wall as outlined in the NCICD Masterplan (NCICD, 2014). At the time of writing, Phase A of the NCICD 
project – the strengthening of 20.1 km of the existing sea wall – is still underway, with funding from 
national and local governments and the private sector (Anwar, 2019). In the absence of a satisfying 
feasibility study the NCICD project was suspended, but this study has now been conducted by the Dutch 
and Korean partners, and the signing of the MoUs marks a new chapter for the NCICD project (NCICD, 
2014). 
The fundamental critique of the NCICD plan is that it does not contain concrete policy action aimed at 
solving land subsidence. The main cause of sinking is still debatable; the Jakarta Mining Agency data 
shows that "80 percent of the cityʼs land subsidence is caused by building particularly high-rise towers, 
17 percent by groundwater exploitation and 3 percent by natural causes" (Rukmana, 2008: 103). In 2016, 
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the first author of this paper attended a focus group discussion of experts in Bandung, Indonesia, 
comprised of university professors and practitioners; this forum agreed that lack of data made it 
impossible to determine the relative contributions of other factors, namely natural consolidation of 
alluvial soil and tectonic activities. Abidin et al. (2008, 2011), however, identify a correlation – if not a 
causal relationship – between the occurrence of land subsidence and the lowering of groundwater levels. 
An interviewee explained that it was difficult to determine the exact contribution of each factor as they 
are interrelated. Groundwater exists in the pore spaces between grains of soil and rock; as the water is 
extracted, the volume of the soil decreases resulting in the consolidation of the soil structure, especially 
soft alluvial soils like those of Jakarta. Subsidence is exacerbated when heavy loads (such as high-rise 
buildings) are added to the surface. 
The urgent need to stop the subsidence is acknowledged in the master plan: "Not stopping subsidence 
means that Jakartaʼs coastal zone is subsiding deeper and deeper below sea level, making solutions for 
the flooding problems increasingly difficult and expensive" (NCICD, 2014: 35). Subsidence is mentioned 
more than 50 times in the master plan, yet the plan does not include a strategy to stop the subsidence 
itself but merely treats symptoms, with the offshore sea wall being presented as a solution. According to 
an interview with a government official, conducted in the course of this research, resources of time, 
energy and capital are focused on the pursuit of the NCICD plan, and consistent water supply and a ban 
on groundwater use have apparently become secondary objectives in Jakartaʼs water policy. 
This paper drew data from policy document analysis as well as from interviews with key informants 
held in between May and September 2016, July 2017 and February 2018. A total of 48 key informants 
were interviewed, including central and local government officials, NGO activists, academics and 
individual experts. We asked for their professional assessments of the NCICD project according to their 
areas of expertise. Insights from interviews were then compared with NCICD policy documents. Drawing 
on informantsʼ risk perceptions and on our own interpretations, we now will explore the externalities of 
the project which are poorly addressed in the public domain. 
THE POLITICS OF WATER SECURITY: DEPOLITICISATION 
Depoliticising water is a powerful strategy for dramatically transforming the existing hydrosocial 
configurations (Sultana, 2013). This is especially the case if stakeholdersʼ interests strongly diverge from 
those of more powerfully represented political actors (Delgado, 2011). The sea wall produces new socio-
natural relationships which transform the existing technological, institutional and symbolic 
arrangements. As observed in other studies (Swyngedouw, 2013; Joy et al., 2014), this depoliticisation 
affects the powerless group because the process produces, or worsens, social inequality. The first half of 
the subsequent section offers three mechanisms of depoliticisation in the process of enhancing water 
security through the construction of Jakartaʼs giant sea wall. The second half discusses power relations 
between state and society within the context of capitalist development in Jakarta. 
Mechanisms of depoliticisation 
As water problems become more complex, depoliticisation continues to occur in many forms (Sultana, 
2013; Swyngedouw, 2013). Joy et al. (2014) maintain that the mainstream approaches to water 
management still tend to "normalise and naturalise" the distributional implications of water problems. 
There are a variety of ways in which water depoliticisation may occur. We identify three interrelated 
mechanisms by which water security problems in Jakarta can be depoliticised by the construction of large 
infrastructure: rendering the issue technical, dehumanising the people, and discounting the future. 
First and most importantly, depoliticisation occurs through framing water insecurity as a technical 
problem that can be solved by mobilising the right expertise. Li (2007), as quoted in Joy et al. (2014: 8), 
notes that "questions that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered non-political". In Jakarta, 
rendering water insecurity as merely a technical matter does not solve the main problem, which is 
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essentially a governance issue. As we have discussed above, policies to stop subsidence are not integrated 
with the NCICD plan. The sea wall may reduce vulnerability to flooding but it treats just a symptom of the 
problem. As the ground continues to subside, the sinking will continue to be a threat. Over-extraction of 
groundwater is purported to be the culprit of land subsidence in Jakarta (see above discussion for the 
interrelated causes of subsidence). This extraction from a deep aquifer, especially for supply to high-rise 
buildings, is caused by poor quantity and quality of piped-water services, a factor which accounts for why 
many people still use groundwater despite their access to piped water (Kooy et al., 2016); low water 
service coverage (only 60% of people covered by the water service) is another important factor (PAM 
Jaya, 2016). From this we can infer the centrality of water governance issues to the problem of land 
subsistence. The political focus and resources given to the sea wall policy have diverted attention from 
solving the main governance problem and have assured policymakers and particularly the public that the 
problem is being solved. 
The NCICD plan, in addressing the problem of flooding, claims "to provide a solution for long-term 
protection of Greater Jakarta against flooding from the sea" and to contribute to the alleviation of riverine 
flooding (NCICD, 2014: 11). Hydrologically, there are three types of flooding in Jakarta: riverine, coastal 
and local. Many of the recent major flood events have resulted from riverine flooding, as was the case in 
February 2007. This type of flooding is caused by heavy but brief storms from upstream catchment areas 
during the December to May wet season (Budiyono et al., 2015). Coastal flooding is caused by high tides 
in combination with subsidence, as occurred in November 2007; this type of flooding is predicted to get 
worse as the northern parts of the city continue to subside (Budiyono et al., 2016). Local flooding occurs 
when the drainage system is not able to capture, store or drain heavy rainfalls that occur within Jakartaʼs 
localities; this was the case in the flood event of January 2013. The impact of climate change cannot be 
proven (Brinkman and Hartman, 2009) but there are indications that these flooding events are becoming 
more frequent. 
The large lagoon that is part of the NCICD plan is intended to buffer river outflows and thus counteract 
the increased coastal flooding that is being aggravated by subsidence; the control of river outflows in the 
coastal areas, however, is dependent on the flow from the wider catchment. It is therefore important to 
view flooding not only from the perspective of its biophysical characteristics but also from an urban 
governance perspective. Poor maintenance of infrastructural systems (e.g. canals and gates), as well as 
uncontrolled growth of the city are among the main factors contributing to riverine flooding. This 
planning problem has been highlighted by many authors (e.g. Steinberg, 2007; Octavianti and Charles, 
2018a), especially as it affects Jakartaʼs water recharge areas in the southern parts of the city. This is 
exacerbated by the "socio-political, historical and spatial marginalisation in the city that has experienced 
centuries of colonial rule" and by post-independence in-migration (Goh, 2019: 251). However, policies to 
restrict development in the designated green areas have been weakly implemented (Gunawan, 2010). In 
public discourse the types and causes of flooding tend to be conflated, and the NCICD plan is believed by 
policymakers and by ordinary citizens to be able to reduce the intensity of flooding; the rapid 
development in the south may therefore not be slowed down anytime soon. The sea wall policy may 
even foreclose the opportunity to govern flooding issues that are related to spatial growth. 
In addition to not solving the main problem, rendering the issue technical may cause overreliance on 
a vulnerable system. Currently, the northern flat part of Jakarta relies on a polder system to keep the 
area dry. Many flood events in this area have been caused by broken pumps, such as the 2008 flooding 
of the toll road running from the city centre to the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (The Jakarta 
Post, 2008). In 2014, in another example, 16 (out of 92) pumps were broken (Fajri, 2014). The NCICD plan 
will depend on a well-operated pumping system to maintain reduced sea levels in the bay. The capacity 
of the pumps used is expected to be at least 730 m3/s (NCICD, 2014), which is the largest in the world, 
larger even than the 600 m3/s New Orleansʼ pumps (Locke, 2009). Securing a sustainable supply of energy 
for the pump operation is also important; it is a matter for consideration given the operation of a nearby 
power plant in Muara Karang may be disrupted by the reclamation site (The Jakarta Post, 2016). As 
Water Alternatives – 2019  Volume 12 | Issue 3 
Octavianti and Charles: Jakartaʼs sea wall plan  Page | 1024 
commented by a consultant in an interview conducted as part of this research, from these findings one 
can infer how this megastructure creates an interdependency with a vulnerable pumping system in a 
country that does not have a good track record in maintaining infrastructure. 
Second, large infrastructure can dehumanise the anthropocentric nature of water security by 
abstracting the social element from the water security equation, what Linton (2014) calls a 'modern 
water' phenomenon. Processes of socio-environmental change are never socially or ecologically neutral 
(Keil, 2000), and different groups in a society have different capacities for adapting to certain 
interventions; improvement in one place or in one group often leads to a deterioration elsewhere. 
'Organic' social differentiation based on wealth and power relations usually define the distribution of 
water risks (Swyngedouw, 2009), and the powerless group often bears the so-called inevitable 
consequences of infrastructure development. 
We illustrate this connection between dehumanisation and water depoliticisation using the fishersʼ 
case in Jakarta Bay. Because the offshore sea wall will close the bay, with the space between the coastline 
and the sea wall utilised for land reclamation, the fishers will not be able to continue fishing there (van 
der Wulp et al., 2016). The narrative according to which the fishers will be evicted asserts that the water 
has been highly polluted and thus the fish caught are poisonous, and there is thus no future in the fishing 
industry. The government will compensate the fishers for their loss of income by offering them blue collar 
jobs on the newly artificial islands, on which a low-cost subsidised building will be allocated to them. This 
compensation clashes with many fishersʼ beliefs and identities, and is likely to worsen the already 
significant inequality in the city (Oxfam, 2017). 
In Jakarta, the 'relevant people' in Latourʼs (1987) statement above can be interpreted as (i) the 
policymakers and the general public who must be convinced of the benefits of the infrastructure (as the 
first mechanism of depoliticisation has demonstrated), and (ii) the marginalised communities who must 
be convinced that they are part of the problem and that therefore their marginalisation or even eviction 
is fully justified. The latter attributes the main problem of subsidence and the related issue of water 
supply to other causes; it suggests that an implicit goal of the sea wall plan is the unification of a 
diversified urban society. As Larkin (2013) notes, the construction of large infrastructures suggests the 
increasing modernity of a city; this is a perceived value of the NCICD plan, which aims to transform Jakarta 
into a world class city (Wade, 2019). The danger in striving for this 'ideal' modern society is its aim of 
transforming a diverse socio-natural urban environment into a government-dominated system (Schmidt, 
2014). 
Third, depoliticisation occurs through discounting the long-term consequences of large-scale 
infrastructure. Construction usually takes place over many years, and the consequences can similarly play 
themselves out over decades. Policymakers most often do not address the long-term consequences or 
externalities of large infrastructures, either intentionally neglecting them or simply failing to detect them. 
The dominant positivist stance of engineers may hinder their inclusion of the seemingly abstract, non-
quantified risks (Delgado and Zwarteveen, 2017; Zwarteveen, 2017). In an interview that was part of this 
research, a consultant commented that the manifesting of consequences outside of the spatiotemporal 
scope of assessment may also impede their detection. The tendency to deny the potential negative 
consequences of large infrastructure projects for future generations can be a violation of the widely 
acknowledged sustainability principle (Emas, 2015). 
The coastal reservoir in Jakarta Bay that may end up as a large black lagoon serves as a harbinger of a 
possible negative future condition resulting from present decisions. Currently, Jakarta Bay is in poor 
environmental condition due to the domestic and industrial wastewater discharge from the metropolitan 
area (van der Wulp et al., 2016). The closure of the bay by the creation of an offshore sea wall makes the 
cleaning of rivers imperative. According to the NCICD Master Plan (NCICD, 2014: 123), the project 
"creates the necessary momentum to implement sanitation measures" in the city by aiming to increase 
sewerage coverage to 75% by 2020, from its 2018 coverage of 7%, which is one of the lowest in urban 
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Asia (KPPIP, 2018). However, neither the Jakarta provincial government nor the central government has 
made any firm commitment to realising this ambitious target. According to a representative from PAL 
Jaya (Jakartaʼs wastewater agency), the city is struggling to find investors for its sewerage project, which 
will require up to 70 trillion Indonesian rupiahs (IDR) (US$5 billion). Without urgent measures to stop 
water contamination, the retention lake will turn into a large, polluted, anoxic lagoon or, as an NGO 
activist described it in an interview that was part of this research, "the biggest rubbish dump and toilet 
in the world". 
Furthermore, considering the interdependent nature of water issues, problems in one sector may 
trigger problems in other sectors, leading to a vicious cycle if not carefully and immediately addressed. 
Environmental degradation, including the lakeʼs poor water quality, may result in health risks for people 
in the area; this, in turn, could reduce perceived quality of life in the new waterfront city, which could 
then affect property prices and thus funding for the sea wall construction. 
The three depoliticisation mechanisms may not be visible from the surface and may only be felt by 
the neediest groups in the society. We now seek to investigate how these mechanisms operate within 
the wider context of Jakartaʼs capitalist development. 
State and society relations 
In our previous analysis (Octavianti and Charles, 2018b), we have examined the political interactions 
between the many stakeholders involved in the NCICD policymaking process, including policymakers, 
private land developers, consultants, NGO activists and academics. Here, we focus on the power of the 
state, demonstrating how state power is consolidated through the NCICD plan and how Jakartaʼs spatial 
and capitalist development shapes the nature of the cityʼs power relations. 
The intricate relationship between state governance and water policy is a function of bureaucratic 
culture and sociopolitical structure (Nickum, 2010). Rather than viewing a state as an organised political 
entity (e.g. Fontana, 2010), we follow Fergusonʼs (1994) conception of the state as a mechanism for 
coordinating power relations or congealing power. State power in that sense refers to "a mode of power 
that relies on state institutions but exceeds them" (ibid: 273). There are several roles that a state adopts 
in a centralised government (Strang, 2016); it can act as 'other' than the people, as representative 'of' the 
people, and 'as' the people themselves. In a democratic political setting, the state acts as a representative 
of the people but it may shift towards enforcing autocratic behaviours. Where the state is very powerful, 
it can operate independently of the society it is meant to serve (Herzfeld, 1991). 
Indonesian democracy is still 'young' as it emerged only in 1998, a result of the Reformasi (Reform) 
that followed the fall of the authoritarian Soeharto regime (1967-1998). In the name of securing the 
economic and political stability required for national development, Soeharto governed Indonesia through 
military and police force. He presided over a repressively controlled system and nurtured alliances with 
foreign and local capitalists (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). In this new era of democracy, however, Indonesia 
still "represents a particularly extreme example of oligarchic dominance and distortion (…). [T]he top 500 
oligarchs are about 600,000 times richer than the average Indonesian" (Winters, 2012: 2), and the 
country is still controlled by a handful of elites who benefitted from years of association with the Soeharto 
regime. This is because capitalism was incubated within the state itself; democratisation provided a 
pathway to power for the oligarchs who had been incubated and nurtured in Soehartoʼs 'New Order' 
dictatorship (Hadiz and Robison, 2013). The civil society groups, while active and robust, are badly 
fragmented and poorly organised, and provide no effective counterbalance to the grip of the oligarchs 
(Aspinall, 2012). 
As observed by Webber (2006), in the decade following the important milestone of the Reformasi, 
Indonesiaʼs democracy took the form of patrimonial democracy; the effectiveness of the government 
was limited because power flowed directly from the leader and a handful of elites. Patrimonialism has 
deep roots in Indonesiaʼs political history, but Webber was optimistic that electoral competition would 
Water Alternatives – 2019  Volume 12 | Issue 3 
Octavianti and Charles: Jakartaʼs sea wall plan  Page | 1026 
move it in a more liberal direction (see also Hadiz and Robison, 2013). Individual rights and freedoms are 
officially recognised and protected, but the exercise of political power is still limited by the rule of law. 
According to the Democracy Index assessment of 167 countries, Indonesia is a "flawed democracy". While 
having relatively "free and fair elections", Indonesia still has "significant weaknesses in other aspects of 
democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of 
political participation" (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017: 54). One can argue, however, that 
Indonesiaʼs democracy status has significantly improved; voter turnout in the 2019 presidential elections 
was 81%, or 158 million out of almost 200 million eligible voters (Farisa, 2019). 
In line with Hadiz and Robison (2013: 40), we highlight the importance of looking beyond the question 
of "whether Indonesia has 'transitioned to democracy', or whether its democracy has now 
'consolidated'"; we instead scrutinise the configurations of sociopolitical power shaping the evolution of 
Indonesian democracy. Given its political context, the NCICD case provides an interesting political arena 
in which to observe how the projectʼs image is shaped by the confrontation between civil society groups 
and elite stakeholders. 
Some authors have analysed the important transformations that Jakarta has undergone, and their 
insights can inform how the depoliticisation mechanisms discussed above operate and why they are 
effective. Tracing the arc of colonial, postcolonial and neoliberal politics, Kusno (2015: 53) contends that 
"the power of Jakarta (…) is attributed to its long entanglement in Dutch colonial connection centuries 
ago, while its recent fortunes or misfortunes owe to the forces of postcolonial nation-building and the 
current phase of capitalist modernisation". The development of neoliberal ideology from the time of 
Soeharto continues to influence the contemporary era (ibid, 2013). 
Analysing Jakartaʼs development along with that of other mega urban regions in Southeast Asia, 
Douglass (2010) concludes that Jakarta has morphed from being an appropriator of rural surpluses 
(precolonial to late 1960s), to export-oriented industrialisation (late 1960s-1980s), to becoming a centre 
of retail consumption (1980s-1997). This last stage of development was made possible by the advent of 
a new era of megaprojects that occurred throughout the world from the mid-1980s onwards (Altshuler 
and Luberoff, 2003). In Jakarta, it created a significant new middle class and a new layer of built 
environment. Aspiring to become a world-class Asian city, the government began to promote 
privatisation and megaprojects by relaxing or even eliminating many of the regulations on land use, and 
in the process reducing public oversight. After the 1998 Asian financial crisis, Jakarta experienced a 
decade of renewed neoliberal reform together with the emergence of 'democratic' governance, a shift 
which has greatly affected its built environment and its citizens. 
Investigating the linkages between Jakartaʼs flood infrastructure and wider spatial transformations, 
Batubara et al. (2018) find that the logic of capitalism underlies the infrastructural approach in the city 
and as a result (re)produces an uneven urbanisation. Their analysis also points out that the production of 
Jakartaʼs contemporary landscape is linked to Soehartoʼs New Order regime under a specific system of 
crony capitalism (Kunio, 1990), a mechanism that is evidenced by, for example, the issuing of permits to 
a crony of Soeharto to convert 831 ha of mangrove forest in northern Jakarta into the luxurious Pantai 
Indah Kapuk development. According to the 1985-2005 Jakarta spatial plan, this area was designated as 
'protected forest area' important for rainwater retention (Leaf, 2015). This is not the only case where 
commercial projects have been built on designated green areas. Some recent governors have 
commented that removing such buildings would be 'impractical'. Clearly it is impossible to separate 
Jakartaʼs transformations from the influence of the powerful elites nurtured during the New Order era. 
We argue that the massive changes that Jakarta has undergone spatially and politically in the past few 
decades affect the depoliticising of agendas and the normalisation of the NCICD plan. Public awareness 
of the 'crisis' of Jakartaʼs sinking and the resulting urgent need for action neutralises concern over the 
negative consequences the megaproject may have. The state uses scientific language – not the explicitly 
repressive approaches that were used in the New Order period – to justify and maintain the large 
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infrastructure policy. Framing the issue 'scientifically' is an approach to curbing social power that is not 
unrelated to an autocratic mode of governance. The state closes down the possibility of exploring other 
alternatives, depriving the public of the opportunity to engage with the policy process. 
As some have demonstrated (e.g. Furlong, 2014; Bijker, 2017), science and technology increasingly 
shape how society works as well as how the state rules the people. Supported by scientific language and 
logic, the state is able to powerfully legitimise its proposal for large-scale infrastructure. The complex 
engineering works that the NCICD plan assembles act to silence civil society groups. In general, there is a 
modern trend to retreat from 'truth language' to 'trust language' (Elzinga, 1997); the public tends to trust 
the infrastructure without seeking the truth (if a genuine truth actually exists). By its fixation of meaning 
on the sinking problem and the sea wall solution, the state manages to narrow the solution down to the 
sea wall. The stateʼs obligation is to protect its people, especially the most vulnerable groups; it may, 
however, be causing them harm by, for example, displacing them without proper compensation. 
To add another layer of complexity, this sophisticated and complex flood defence was developed 
based on input from the Dutch consortium Deltares, and design work was done by the Dutch architecture 
firm KuiperCompagnons; local experts were only minimally involved (Salim et al., 2019). After the major 
flood of 2007 (one of the largest floods in Jakartaʼs history), the Government of Indonesia, through the 
Ministry of Public Works, asked for help from the Dutch government. The Netherlands is known as the 
worldʼs water expert and during the colonial era was involved in early phases of Jakartaʼs development 
(Octavianti and Charles, 2018a) making them Indonesiaʼs most suitable partner for solving this water 
problem. However, 'outsourcing' the entire design process to another country sparked suspicion among 
NGO activists and concerned academics (Colven, 2017). The complex modelling of the NCICD plan has 
been justified to the public unaccompanied by clear and sufficient information. Analysing newspaper 
articles addressing issues around the NCICD plan and land subsidence, Octavianti and Charles (2018b) 
argue that land subsidence has been problematised in such a way as to frame the NCICD plan as the only 
solution. It is not surprising to learn that a (simplified) scientific argument has been used to justify this 
megaproject. While scientists are truly concerned that complex scientific language may overwhelm the 
public, it is ironic that fear of Jakartaʼs sinking was exploited to capitalise the project. 
Modern states have been characterised by the degree to which they control the development and 
deployment of water infrastructure (Molle et al., 2009). Swyngedouw (2015), for instance, in describing 
Spainʼs hydraulic state-making, observes how the priorities of local society and the environment have 
been subsumed to economic and political priorities. The state, as Walker (2014: 390) argues, should 
function "as coordinator of collective action and as an intermediary between the public and private 
spheres". The nature of the stateʼs role, however, has changed. In Jakarta, the state has used scientific 
language to help slowly diminish its mediating role. Without intending to demonise the experts involved 
in the sea wall project, we merely suggest that weakened social power can possibly lead to autocratic 
management within water policy. To date, the NCICD plan has involved a dynamic policymaking process, 
relatively uncontested at the time of its launch in 2013, then highly debated following a corruption 
scandal in 2016. A political event like corruption acts as an efficient window of opportunity or critical 
juncture to strategically adjust the policy framework of a project like NCICD (Octavianti and Charles, 
2018b). In the absence of such an event, the social and environmental impacts associated with the project 
can be cushioned by the promise of enhanced safety and development. 
Having identified three mechanisms of depoliticisation, and the state-society power relations 
underpinning this process, we now reflect on Fergusonʼs (1994) findings on the process of depoliticisation 
in Lesothoʼs development projects. He argues that the promise of the elimination of poverty through 
agricultural transformation in Lesotho is "a point of entry for an intervention of a very different character" 
(ibid: 255). This also seems to be the case in Jakarta. A disaster preparedness scheme aimed at reducing 
Jakartaʼs risk of sinking serves as an entry point to the NCICD plan for wider political interests. Its 
reclamation element provides an opportunity for elites to access interesting development contracts and 
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concessions. Salim et al. (2019) suggest that the NCICD project allows New Order elites, now marginalised 
by democratisation, to form 'growth coalitions' which give them privileged access to contracts. 
Ferguson (1994: 357) then hypothesises that the development apparatus works as a machine that is 
able, with the flick of a switch, to protect "even the most sensitive political operations" from the effects 
of politics, what he calls the "anti-politics machine". We argue that such a mechanism occurs to some 
extent in Jakarta. The complex nature of the sinking process and the scientific justification of the NCICD 
plan makes the workings of the plan inaccessible to most people. However, instead of viewing the NCICD 
plan as a form of anti-politics machine, we see it as one part of a series, or system, of anti-politics 
configurations. Jakartaʼs flood mitigation strategy has followed a characteristic infrastructural approach, 
including an ongoing 19 km canalisation project of major rivers and the construction of grand canals in 
the western (14.5 km) and eastern (23.6 km) parts of the city (Octavianti and Charles, 2018a). The NCICD 
program is the largest scheme in the cityʼs history and supports the operation of the entire configuration 
of infrastructure. 
Lastly, Ferguson (1994) observes that the expansion of state power in the depoliticisation process may 
actually weaken its power. In its role of overall coordinator, the state does not expand its power but 
instead expands the extent and reach of the loops around existing power relations. In Lesotho, the 
national government occupied a less powerful position than did the developmental agencies and donor 
countries. Similarly, in Jakarta some indicators of a reduction of the relative power of the state have also 
been observed. For example, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, Jakartaʼs former governor, was criticised for not 
being able to revoke the reclamation permits given to private developers. He argued that the permits 
had been legally issued by a regulation that was in place prior to his tenure (Huda, 2016). The state, in 
this sense, handed over the future contingencies of the project to private developers (Wade, 2019). In 
the even longer run, state power over the megaproject is likely to be further reduced because of its 
accessibility only to (foreign) experts. 
We have explained thus far how the present and potential depoliticisation actions have been 
influenced by Indonesiaʼs political structure and Jakartaʼs capitalist development. In order to minimise 
externalities and inequalities caused by the pursuit of the sea wallʼs construction, we suggest a strategy 
for resituating politics in Jakartaʼs water security issues. 
 REPOLITICISING WATER THROUGH THE HYDROSOCIAL CYCLE 
As water has specific contextualised meanings that link spatial and temporal scales and produce specific 
sources of power relations (Bakker, 2012), we tailor the concept of the hydrosocial cycle to the context 
of large infrastructure. Constituting more than just background, infrastructure can fundamentally change 
or even disrupt power relations. Infrastructure and water security are highly political; however, the 
repoliticisation proposed here is targeted not at infrastructure but at the issue of water security. Taking 
a step back and viewing the depoliticising mechanisms discussed above through the lens of the 
hydrosocial cycle, we are hoping to identify sites for repoliticisation of the issues. 
The hydrosocial cycle concept represents waterʼs broader social dimensions by internalising the politics 
of water, as opposed to simply treating water as the object of politics (Linton and Budds, 2014). Three 
components of the cycle – waterʼs materiality (H2O), technology/infrastructure, and social power/social 
structures – interact in a two-directional cyclic relationship (Figure 1a). 'Water' (identified in the centre 
of the circle) is the outcome of this socio-natural process; it acquires a new meaning from the co-
constitution of ideas, discourse and power relations in any assemblage of socio-natural processes. The 
main characteristic of the hydrosocial cycle is that the socio-natural processes occur internally; this means 
"a shift from thinking of relations between things – such as the impacts of humans on water quality – to 
the relations constituting things – such as the cultural, economic and political processes that constitute 
the particular character of desalinated water, treated drinking water or holy water" (Linton and Budds, 
2014: 173, emphasis in original). In mobilising the concept, we propose to refine 'water' to 'water 
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security' as a goal in the centre of the circle. This is not only to build an explicit connection between the 
hydrosocial cycle and water security but also to highlight the importance of the cycle as the basis for 
securing water. This suggests that any attempts to improve water security should not under-represent 
society as one of the elements of the cycle. 
In the current discourse promoting the NCICD plan, the interaction between water and society is 
viewed as a linear relationship. The offshore sea wall – the main component of the plan – is sold to the 
public as a disaster preparedness scheme. Technology is believed to improve the materiality of water 
(H2O) and to further improve peopleʼs overall livelihood. Such a linear perspective is problematic as it 
eliminates the capacity of the components' internal interaction to create the many externalities that have 
been discussed above. In Jakarta, we identify multiple assemblages emerging from socio-natural 
processes which, together, constitute what 'water security' feels like to the people. These include: the 
different types of water that together constitute 'urban' water, the different social groups and their 
power relations, and the different and corresponding elements of the megastructure. Below we examine 
the elements comprising Jakartaʼs hydrosocial cycle – technology, H2O and society (Figure 1b) – and then 
discuss potential sites at which the whole constellation can be shifted. 
Figure 1. a) The hydrosocial cycle as proposed by Linton and Budds (2014); b) our interpretation of the 
hydrosocial cycle as it operates in Jakartaʼs case. 
  
In the hydrosocial cycle there is no beginning or end, as changes to any element affect the whole socio-
natural process. It is our view, however, that in Jakarta it is likely to be large infrastructure that disrupts 
the process. It is worth remembering here that the NCICD plan is comprised of several elements: the 
onshore sea wall (the urgent need for which has been agreed to by both the proponents and opponents 
of the plan); the offshore sea wall (the main component of the plan); and the reclamation and coastal 
reservoir. While the offshore sea wall may initially fulfil its flood-control purpose, it is not clear how 
externalities have been incorporated into the policymaking process. The sea wall and reclamation will 
significantly alter the hydraulic conditions in the bay, which will in turn affect at least sediment deposition 
and wave-tide-circulation system. Therefore, it may improve the materiality of water in terms of 
protection from flooding, but there may also be severe consequences which in turn affect the social 
domain, further transforming the cycle. 
In terms of the materiality of water (H2O), we have till now focused primarily on flooding, and have 
tended to underplay the interrelationship with other forms of urban water including drinking water, 
sanitation, water for environmental needs, and water for economic growth. Although all these types of 
water shape the experience of water security, in any given context one form of water tends to 
predominate; in a water-scarce area, for example, people will be likely to prioritise drinking water over 
safe sanitation facilities. The interactions of urban water in Jakarta are quite clearly producing the cityʼs 
subsidence; it is also understood how the NCICD plan may affect these interactions. Briefly, as residents 
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and businesses have not had reliable access to water, they have been accessing groundwater as their 
main water source, a practice which has been purported to be the main reason for land subsidence. 
Furthermore, the offshore sea wall will close off Jakarta Bay and will trap the poor-quality water flowing 
from the metropolitan catchments. The inadequate sanitation system in the city is the main contributor 
to the deterioration of the coastal environment (van der Wulp et al., 2016). It is therefore of major 
importance to also acknowledge the effect on hydrosocial relations of the interaction of diverse types of 
water beyond the coastal areas. 
The final element in the hydrosocial cycle is social structure and its embedded power. Urban areas 
have been characterised by large inequalities that stem from the cityʼs historical transformations (OECD, 
2018). Urban society is not uniform; it consists of heterogeneous groups that have unequal vulnerability 
to environmental shocks (Grasham et al., 2019). Environmental injustice can exacerbate existing social 
inequalities of class, gender, age and ethnicity (Nightingale, 2011). Elites and upper class individuals are 
powerful and have the capacity to reduce their vulnerability to environmental hazards. The poor 
communities have the least power to voice their concerns and have historically been marginalised. The 
'middle class' is characterised differently in different cultures but generally lies between the two in terms 
of power and wealth. 
The fishing community is likely to be the group most impacted by the construction of the sea wall. 
Over time, however, coastal communities – including elites living in the waterfront areas – may feel the 
impact of the poor management of coastal waters. Figure 2 shows the benefits and disadvantages of 
Jakartaʼs sea wall project on three social classes in three temporal scenarios. We predict that the NCICD 
project will yield only short-term benefits for the upper and middle classes. Upper class citizens may in 
the long term experience a massive reduction in water security if no steps are taken to mitigate the 
deterioration of the waterfront environment. While the figure is based on hypothetical calculations, such 
visualisations can aid in articulating the projectʼs potential impacts on different groups over time. This is 
also in line with Salim et al.ʼs (2019) 'maladaptation' argument, which suggests that the project could 
increase vulnerability to climate shocks. 
Figure 2. Illustration of the different levels of water security anticipated from the NCICD project for three 
social classes in Jakarta (upper/green, middle/blue and lower/red), over three different 
timescales: current state; projection state expected once the project is completed and fully 
functioning; and the long-term projection state ('1' is the lowest level of security and '5' is the 
highest). 
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A new articulation of water security is informed and co-constituted by the different types of water, the 
state of infrastructure and the interaction of social groups; this is set against external factors such as the 
historical political structure and its attendant discourses, and the involvement of foreign experts. It is a 
dynamic cyclical process which is continually transformed as changes occur to its components. The 
plurality in the society must be highlighted in order to prevent deterioration in socio-natural relations 
that may result from, or be exacerbated by, the introduction of large infrastructure. Addressing the 
situation in this way can create an entry point for making changes and can reveal the ways in which social 
inequalities can be produced and sustained through water. 
Recognising social plurality is a basic political condition that enables rights to be debated and socially 
negotiated (Mouffe, 1993). For Fontana (2010: 4), "civil society is not one and harmonious, as in Platoʼs 
ideal Polis city, but a plurality of spaces, socio-political and physical/territorial". By appreciating this 
plurality, contestation of unequal treatment with regard to water security can have more political clout 
(Joy et al., 2014). We particularly want to highlight the need to shift the power base to the middle class2 
in order to influence the NCICD policy. The rise of the middle class in Indonesia has been consistent with 
the wider trend in other Southeast Asiaʼs metropolitan regions; beginning in the mid-1980s, it has 
continued to grow since the 1997 financial crises. It has led to the increase in megaprojects in the region 
(and their consequences), as indicated by the proliferation of new towns in the Greater Jakarta (Firman, 
2004). As the largest group within Indonesiaʼs population, its middle class supports the economic growth 
of the country through its consumption, wealth creation and taxation. Liddle (2013) asserts that 
economic growth is beneficial for democracy as a progressive middle class demands rule of law and 
political participation. Their power is notably lower than that of the elite, but the middle class is usually 
more concerned with the quality of government services and can become a powerful voice in demanding 
improvements in governance (World Bank, 2017). Furthermore, in an era where people are increasingly 
connected through social media, their collective power is significant (Mahault et al., 2017). For all these 
reasons, it seems promising to appeal to the middle class for help in achieving collective water security 
by amplifying the marginalised voice of the poor. 
In this section, we have argued the importance of recognising social diversity in conceptualising water 
security. It is a stance that should not be read as romanticising marginalised citizens; instead, we aim to 
show how inequality and insecurity are produced through infrastructure and how the groups with the 
least power are blamed for the collective insecurity. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to examine the political ecology of water security in the context of large 
infrastructure. We argue that major hydraulic works have the potential to depoliticise water security by 
rendering water issues as merely technical problems, dehumanising the people and discounting future 
consequences. The causes of water insecurity in Jakarta are political and structural, and not simply 
geographical and technical; stakeholders are therefore not a neutral instrument. As the paper has 
demonstrated, technology and society are inseparable, and they are important entities in the co-
constitution of the socio-natural process. Unsurprisingly, however, large infrastructure has been devised 
to abstract the societal dimension in which the technology operates and used to purposely divert 
attention from the actual complex problem of sinking. These depoliticisation mechanisms have deep 
roots in Indonesiaʼs political structure and in Jakartaʼs spatial and political transformation, especially 
during Soehartoʼs repressive New Order regime (1967-1998). These have had a strong influence on 
capitalist development in the city, including the capitalism value embedded in the NCICD policy. 
                                                          
2 According to Rastogi et al. (2013), the 'middle class' (which is further divided into 'upper middle', 'middle' and 'emerging middle' 
class), refers to households whose monthly expenditures are between IDR1.5 and 5 million (US$100-340). In 2012, there were 
109.2 million people in this group. This number is expected to be 168 million in 2020, which will make it the largest group (64%) 
in the country. 
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In the long term, depoliticisation may trigger autocratic management of Jakartaʼs water policy. This 
autocracy may appear to be subtler than the conventional authoritarian mode of governance, but may 
even so not provide opportunity for public involvement in the decision-making process or for the 
exploration of alternative strategies for water security. To avoid such an end, we propose to refine the 
concept of the hydrosocial cycle by tailoring it to the large-infrastructure context. Mainly, we suggest the 
recognition of social diversity and the empowerment of the middle class to voice their concerns with 
regard to the achievement of collective water security. 
In framing water security as one face of a broader transformative politics, we borrow from Sultana 
and Loftusʼs (2012) insights on the human right to water. Rather than being an 'empty signifier', water 
security can be regarded as the focal point of a political struggle to achieve a water-secure future without 
exacerbating inequalities – an approach which positions people and politics at the centre of water 
security. As Butterworth et al. (2010: 74) suggest, there is an urgent need to "recognize water politics as 
a reality and also an opportunity… [and] a catalyst for public involvement and change". In the end, water 
security will be achieved by citizens, not by engineers, politicians and business people. 
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